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Abstract
Research Question How accurately can all recorded locations of 97 knife homicides in
one year be forecast across all 4835 Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) of
London, based only upon all 3506 known locations of nonfatal knife injury assaults in
the preceding year?
Data All recorded “knife crimes” in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) area of
London in the financial year 2016–2017 (year 1) were manually reviewed to identify all
3506 reported locations of knife-enabled (KE) but nonfatal injuries, as distinct from
other events digitally coded as “knife crimes”, such as displaying, threatening with, or
carrying knives. All KE homicides in 2017–2018 (year 2) were then added to the
database.
Methods Each KE injury assault in year 1 was classified for occurrence in one of
London’s 4835 LSOAs. The total N of such crimes within each LSOA was summed
across all records to divide all LSOAs into seven categories of frequency of KE injury
assaults in 2016/2017: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 or more. We then divided the N of LSOAs
in each category in 2016/2017 (year 1) into the total N of knife homicides in 2017/2018
(year 2). False positives, false negatives, and percentage of homicides targeted were
calculated for six different targeting plans.
Findings Over two thirds (69%) of KE homicides in 2017/2018 (year 2) occurred in
just 67 (1.4%) of all 4835 LSOAs, comprising 3.3% of the 2048 LSOAs that had had
one or more of the 3506 KE injury assaults mapped in 2016/2017 (year 1). The
proportion of LSOAS with a KE homicide in year 2 was higher where there were
higher numbers of KE injury assaults per LSOA in year 1. Among LSOAs with zero
assaults in year 1, only 1% had a KE homicide in year 2. Among LSOAs with six or
more KE injury assaults in year 1, 15% had a KE homicide in year 2. While the risk of
homicide was 1400% higher in the hottest spots of knife assaults than in the coolest
spots, the absolute number of year two KE homicides in those hottest areas was only
6% of the total. All LSOAs with one or more year 1 KE assaults had three times as
much KE homicide risk than LSOAs with no year 1 KE assaults. Targeting all 2048
areas that had one or more year 1 KE assaults would have yielded a true positive rate of
over 3% and covered 69% of actual homicide locations. The true negative rate for 2781
areas that would not have been targeted based on having no year 1 KE injuries would
have been 99%.
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Conclusions Predicting which local areas are most likely to suffer knife-enabled homi-
cides, based only on recent nonfatal knife injuries, can pinpoint risks of homicide in
local areas that are up to 1400% higher than in most local areas, offering a range of
strategies for resource allocation.
Keywords Homicide .Knives . Prediction .Knife assaults . Targetingaccuracy.Hot spots .
Lower Layer Super Output Areas . LSOA
Introduction
How predictable are the locations of knife homicide in London? That question is
difficult to answer based on professional experience, given the rarity of homicides in
any specific location. As Mark Jackson of the Metropolitan Police Service (2010)
discovered, only 12% (579) of all 4765 local census areas of London had any knife-
enabled homicides over the 10 years from 2000 to 2010. Over 365 days from April
2017, our own study finds that only 1% of the 4835 local areas (2011 Census) had any
of the locatable 97 knife-enabled (KE) homicides. Moreover, there were no local areas
that had more than one such homicide, which means that there were no hot spots of
repeated knife homicides that year (contra Sherman et al. 1989; Weisburd 2015).
There were, however, clearly identifiable hot spots of nonfatal KE assaults. It is
these nonfatal knife crimes that provide a reliable, if far from perfect, basis for
forecasting KE homicides over the time span of 1 year. Over two thirds (69%) of all
KE homicides in 2017/2018 (which this study calls “year 2”) occurred in the 2048 local
areas where one or more of the 3543 KE assaults were reported to have occurred in
London in “year 1” (2016/2017). Interspersed between those hot spots, at the same
time, were 2787 areas that had zero nonfatal KE assaults in 2016/2017 (year 1), and
only 1% of those had a KE homicide in year 2.
Such rare events are difficult for any professional to forecast based on personal
experience alone (Sutherland and Mueller-Johnson 2019). Even if police officers
consult digitized crime records and maps, however, they would be misled by the failure
of official statistics to count the precise behavior that kills: stabbing or cutting people
with knives. Under current record-keeping systems, what the Office of National
Statistics presents a wide array of crimes in which a knife was used: threats to kill,
robbery, assaults without injury, etc. (ONS 2019). The only way to identify where
victims of stabbing were stabbed nonfatally in England in 2019 is to read the full text of
a narrative report, with no digital code available to indicate actual stabbings.
Yet it is the actual stabbing behavior that is critically important for the problem of
KE homicide. Remarkably, the ratio of deaths per stabbing in London in 2016/2017
was 1 in 66 (see below), while in Chicago in 1965, it was almost identical at 1 in 55
(Zimring 1968). Given a large body of weapons crime research available in the USA
(Wellford et al. 2005), our aim was to test the forecasting value of precisely counting
the behavior most likely to cause death by knife.
Our objective in this article is to demonstrate whether comprehensive statistical
analysis of where KE assaults have occurred in the recent past will help to forecast
where KE homicides are most likely to occur in the near future. While we do not
compare that forecasting method to the accuracy of forecasts based on qualitative
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intelligence, we note that there is presently no research evidence available on the
accuracy of either method of forecasting murder. By testing the comprehensive data-
driven approach over 2 years, we can at least set a benchmark of predictive accuracy for
other methods to beat. We also hope to assess the value of a major investment in a rapid
change of crime counting systems, in order to count, map, and analyze KE assaults
separately and distinctly from all other knife crimes.
A Digital Policing Strategy
Such forecasts as we present here can become even more accurate if they are embedded
into a digital policing strategy—one that uses ongoing data processing programs to
update the city-wide homicide forecasts immediately upon new information being added
to a forecasting model. Yet, we must recognize the substantial imitations of any
forecasting of homicide risk by location. Even if we knew with 100% probability where
homicides would happen in London during one of the 525,600 min a year, we would be
greatly challenged to predict when they will occur across the possible targets of
525,600 min × 4835 local census areas, which is equal to 2.5 billion place minutes
per year. On the other hand, if we define the challenge of evidence-based targeting as
sending police to where they would bemost likely to prevent homicide, a digital policing
approach should offer great advantages over conventional policing. By using up-to-the-
minute data on well-tested predictors, police commanders could move resources imme-
diately to where they may produce the greatest benefits in saving lives. That challenge is
especially salient with homicides committed by concealed weapons, notably knives and
guns.
What predictors might work best? A digital policing strategy, in the not-too-distant
future, could monitor London’s crime patterns in real time for daily forecasting of
locations at the highest risk of a knife-enabled homicide. Many variables, from social
media activity to the weather, could become part of a forecasting model, as discussed at
a Ditchley Foundation conference chaired by Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
Commissioner Cressida Dick (Dick 2018). Yet, the entire concept of forecasting
remains unfamiliar and often controversial, with frequent misunderstandings. Before
a complex forecasting model is used to deploy police resources, police legitimacy
would be well served by having a transparent, single-predictor basis for demonstrating
the very great (and statistically predictable) differences in homicide risk levels from
each local area to all others.
Counting Near-Miss Murders
The most fundamental starting point for predicting most kinds of rare events is near-
misses of those events, in which the highest harm level almost occurs but does not
actually happen. In air traffic safety, the near-miss concept implies that no harm occurs
at all, as when two planes almost collide but do not. In policing, however, the
relationship between fatal and nonfatal violence has long been understood to comprise
a near-miss to a fatal injury. Using such near-misses to forecast homicide, based on
long-term patterns of prior assaults (Mohler 2014), has been shown to provide sub-
stantial improvements over short-term-only analyses, especially by using most recent
data in combination with longer-term patterns.
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Testing Tactics in Targeted Hot Spots
Even daily updates of such forecasting, however, do not provide guidance on the
particular police practices that should be employed in each high-risk location. Exactly
what to do is, of course, a matter for testing, given reliable targeting of where to do it
(Sherman 2013). Fortunately, in the case of weapon-enabled homicide, there is already
a growing body of theory and evidence, albeit mostly from the USA. One theory dates
to 1980, when two Harvard criminologists (Wilson 1980; Moore 1980) independently
proposed that gun homicides could be reduced by focusing on widespread gun carrying
by numerous gun carriers. The Harvard theory emerged shortly after the criminological
perspective called routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), which itself built on
the UK Home Office situational crime prevention literature (Mayhew et al. 1976), all of
which stressed that opportunity is essential for committing a crime.
By focusing on concealed weapons as the proximate opportunity for committing
most weapon-enabled homicides, the Harvard theorists suggested that police could
deter decisions to carry weapons more readily than police could deter decisions to
commit homicide. Wilson and Moore argued, in effect, that if illicit weapons are left at
home for fear of arrest for illegal carrying, people inclined to use those weapons will
have no opportunity to use them when encountering someone they might decide to
attack. The deterrence of weapon carrying would thus block the opportunity to commit
homicide, which would then reduce the frequency of homicide itself.
The evidence testing the Wilson-Moore theory has consistently supported its pre-
diction. In a series of field tests in Kansas City (MO) (Sherman et al. 1995), Indianap-
olis (McGarrell et al. 2001), Pittsburgh (Cohen & Ludwig 2003), and St. Louis
(Rosenfeld et al. 2014), police consistently found support for the target-the-carrying
strategy causing a reduction in murders or weapons injuries [see also Bogota and Cali
in Colombia (Villaveces et al. 2000)]. Shootings of guns, measured by either deaths,
hospital treatment, or crime reports, went down in the test sites of all of these studies,
relative to untreated high-shooting areas, when police targeted high-harm areas with
proactive patrols and stop-search strategies. According to a systematic review of most
of this work (Koper and Mayo-Wilson 2006), not one test failed to find evidence that
criminal weapon usage declined when police targeted weapon carrying—in hot spot
areas where weapon crime was concentrated. In each US case, this strategy began with
careful analysis of where weapon-enabled homicides were most likely to occur, and
concluded with intensive proactive policing of weapon carrying in those areas.
Do Near-Miss Injuries Predict Knife Homicide in London?
That proactive US strategy has been at the core of a long debate over stop and search in
England andWales. In general, however, theUKdebate has neglected any discussion of two
kinds of evidence. One is the evidence that stop-and-searchworks best when it is confined to
a tiny fraction of a city where weapons crimes are most likely to occur. The US evidence
showed success of using stop and search, but not just anywhere. It is all tested on precisely
targeted crime hot spots, as distinct from an undifferentiated use of that tactic across any and
all locations. The other evidence missing in the UK debate has been research on whether
geographic concentrations of weapon-enabled homicides even exist in the UK—a crucial
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premise for a policy of limiting the most intrusive policing to that tiny fraction of any city in
which a risk of weapon-enabled homicide is highest.
This article contributes to that second area of evidence missing from the UK debate.
It is only a first, but crucial, step towards a more refined digital policing strategy for
preventing homicide. This step provides what appears to be the first UK test of the
hypothesis that any form of homicide can be predicted in micro-areas on the basis of
prior near-misses, or nonfatal assaults using the same weapon as the fatal assaults. By
using 4835 small census areas across London to pinpoint where knife carrying most
commonly leads to nonfatal woundings, the article assesses whether the locations of
those KE woundings can provide more accurate forecasts of future KE homicide
locations.
Targeting Lower Layer Super Output Areas
In adopting this approach, this study builds upon the work of Metropolitan Police
Service Detective Superintendent Mark Jackson (2010), whose Cambridge M.St. thesis
first analyzed London’s homicide distribution within relatively small locations called
Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs). These areas, like US Census tracts, are
defined by the decennial UK Census of the Office of National Statistics. These geo-
graphical areas, in London in 2011, were home to an average of 1722 people each (based
on the last census) and may be as small as 200 metres square. Nationally, each LSOA
had 400 to 1200 households (Office of National Statistics 2011, 2019).
What Jackson (2010) showedwith these areas was not just the concentration of knife-
enabled homicide in a small number of these areas (with 88% of LSOAs across London
free from any knife homicides over 10 years). He also showed that these “homicide
hotspots” are themselves geographically very small. That size means that, in theory, KE
homicide can be more effectively prevented by concentrating police resources at higher
levels of blue uniforms or police cars per square foot (Sherman 2013).
While the MPS in 2019 is reorganizing 32 separately run operational command units
(OCUs) into only 12, far larger, basic command units (BCUs), it becomes even more
important for BCU commanders to have micro-level data on each LSOA. Jackson’s
(2010) discovery that only 6% of LSOAs accounted for 42% of all homicides over
10 years showed the serious limitation of using large areas as operational units of
analysis. Most parts of the 32 large OCUs had no homicide at all for a decade.
Targeting at the LSOA level, however, revealed patterns of homicides recurring in
many LSOAs year after year.
The purpose of such analysis is not a passive prediction of future homicide trends.
Rather, our aim is to show how useful it would be for digital policing to produce
regularly updated maps of locations where homicide is most likely to occur in the near
future. This should, in principle, enable police leaders to target, and even test, more
efficient and effective measures to prevent homicides with digital policing forecasts.
Research Questions
This article addresses a small but vital subset of a larger analysis of homicide across
London in 2008–2018 reported in the first author’s M.St. thesis (Massey 2018). Our
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present focus is on how the key elements of that analysis can be turned into decision
support tools for operational policing. The central question is how best to forecast and
target locations where most KE homicides are most likely to occur.
That broad question has many potential answers. This study focuses on whether one of
the most powerful answers is to look closely at near-miss homicides as a powerful predictor
of completed homicides. Our focus is purposely limited to KE homicides and near-misses
because they have risen most rapidly in recent years. They are also homogenous group that
offers more reliability in predictions than the full diversity of all homicides. While many
other predictors could ultimately contribute to a daily forecastingmodel, we limit the present
analysis so that a wide audience can understand how purely objective criteria can be used for
targeting police resources to save lives.
These are the four specific research questions for this article:
1. Does the prevalence of KE homicide across LSOAs in a given year (year 2)
predictably increase with higher frequency of KE assaults in an LSOA in the prior
year (year 1)?
2. If so, how much higher is the highest risk level for KE homicide compared to the
lowest risk level, in terms of the likelihood that any KE homicide occurs in year 2?
3. What is the level of “sensitivity” or true positive homicide prediction rate from a
decision to target LSOAs with extra policing resources at different levels of KE
assaults?
4. What is the level of “specificity” or true negative rate from a decision to target
LSOAs with extra policing resources at different levels of KE assaults?
While these questions are basic to all evidence-based targeting decisions, from cancer
treatment to automobile safety, they are rarely addressed in a policing context. We
present them as the first step in forecasting and targeting not only KE homicide, but
also any kind of rare and highly harmful outcomes in policing. The same questions
could be asked about targeting missing persons’ investigations, or allocating special
traffic speed enforcement to frequent crash zones. The answers to these four questions
cannot tell police what to do, or even where to do it. Nonetheless, they are essential to
making informed choices about how to balance the strengths and limitations of any
course of action.
Data
Two main data sources were required for this analysis: the locations of KE homicides
and the locations of KE assaults. The former was readily available. The latter posed
substantial barriers and costs in classification. (Digitizing these data would be the first
step for implementing this method of forecasting knife murders).
Underpinning both datasets is the Metropolitan Police Crime Reporting Information
System (CRIS). The MPS records every allegation or instance of crime within CRIS; in
doing so, a plethora of different data items is recorded by the reporting officer and the
secondary investigating units. A selection of these data was extracted from the original
database to construct a new, tabulated record of every single recorded homicide for the
period 2008–2018 (using sequential, financial year periods). This included all forms of
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“culpable” homicide (i.e., manslaughter) but not attempts. Each homicide event then
had appended to the weapon used.
Typological and demographical detail on the CRIS system is created initially by the
first recording officer and later amended by the investigating unit if subsequent
enquiries prove a particular code to have been missed or erroneously appended. For
example, if a homicide were later discovered to be drug-related, a “flag” would be
added to the crime report to this effect; these flags are the characteristic features of the
event or victim that are absorbed into the dataset.
In addition, each homicide event, treated as a single unit of analysis, had affixed to it
the corresponding geocoded location of the homicide (LSOA). In three of the 100 knife-
enabled homicides in 2017/2018, the location of the stabbing could not be determined
after the victim was admitted to hospital. Therefore, our analysis is based on all 97 of the
KE homicides in which a geographic location of knife attack was recorded.
In a separate dataset, each of the 3543 nonfatal knife injury offenses in 2016/2017
was entered and their geographical locations were added. The initial data were derived
from the CRIS database compiled by MPS police officers. Because a manual review [of
text] was required to determine, in every case, whether an assault was knife-enabled
and in which LSOA each KE assault occurred, it was only possible to code a single,
most recent year’s accessible data. These data were further transformed to make each
LSOA a unit of analysis. Once these data had been extracted and collated, the
corresponding homicide counts for both year 1 (2016–2017) and year 2 (2017–2018)
were added to the KE assault data in year 1 in each corresponding LSOA.
For year 1 (2016/2017), only 3506 of the 3543 nonfatal knife injury offenses could
be geocoded; for the rest, the location of the stabbing was not known. Further analysis
revealed that 2048 different LSOAs were the locations for these 3506 nonfatal knife
assaults. Thus, 42% of London’s 4835 LSOAs experienced a knife assault in
2016/2017, while 97 (2%) of the total 4835 had one or more homicides in 2017/2018.
Limitations and Data Integrity
Verification of CRIS data integrity was undertaken through reference to a separate com-
puter database, the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES)—employed
separately by investigators working within the Homicide and Major Crime Command. A
(dip-sampled) cross-comparison of the same events as recorded in both CRIS and
HOLMES was used to test whether a vital detail in CRIS was accurate, in 42 separate
homicides, each selected randomly from the period. All 42 were found to hold the same
typological and demographic data in HOLMES as the CRIS report of the same incident.
Each event can, of course, be given more than one categorical label. A knife-enabled
homicide can equally be counted as a domestic/familial homicide or, likewise, a drug or
gang-related homicide—if all of these characteristics are also present within the
surrounding circumstances. For more details on data collection, see Massey (2018).
Methods
The primary method of this analysis is to compare all London LSOAs in the financial
year 2016/2017 (year 1) to all LSOAs in 2017/2018 (year 2). By sorting each LSOA
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into different categories in each of the 2 years, the study was able to use year 1 coding
to forecast year 2 patterns. The year 1 data combined all LSOA-specific frequencies
from CRIS data listing knife-enabled serious assaults. The year 2 data on KE homicides
were then assessed for risk levels in relation to whether each LSOA with a year 2
homicide had been coded for having had 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 or more knife-enabled
nonfatal injury attacks in year 1.
We then computed the prevalence (in percent) of year 2 KE homicides among
LSOAs in each of the seven KE assault frequency categories in year 1. The magnitude
and differences in percentages were calculated in the simplest terms possible, to make
the findings transparent to the widest possible audience for a dialog of police legitimacy
(Bottoms and Tankebe 2012).
What is harder to explain to a wider audience is the difficult trade-off between the
specificity and sensitivity of a forecasting tool (Yerushalmy 1947). The specificity of a
prediction is defined as the true positive rate: what proportion of all predictions (or
detections, as in cancer or other diseases for which tests are conducted on people) turn
out to be accurate? (The false positive rate is derived by subtracting the true positive
percentage from 100%; see Table 2). The sensitivity of a prediction, in contrast, is the
probability of a negative prediction being accurate: the true negative rate. (The true
negative rate is derived by subtracting the false negative percentage from 100%). In a
perfect prediction, both positive and negative predictions would be 100% true. In
practice, forecasting usually confronts an inverse relationship between true positives
and true negatives: the higher the true positive rate, the lower the true negative rate. The
more false positives a prediction avoids, the more false negatives it is likely to generate.
The method of presenting both specificity and sensitivity in comparison to each
other (see Table 2 below) offers a more precise way of framing difficult resource
allocation decisions for senior police leaders.
Findings
Facts on the Context
Rising Homicides
This study was undertaken in a period of rising total homicides in London, as displayed
in Fig. 1.
The study period had an even more rapid increase in KE homicides, as shown in Fig. 2,
with a 100% increase from 50 to 100 KE homicides in 2016/2017 to 2017/2018, reaching
a record high annual proportion over the decade of two thirds of total homicides (Fig. 3).
In the 10-year period to 2018, there were 590 knife-enabled homicides across
London. As a proportion of the yearly total for all kinds of homicide, KE homicide
showed some annual variation. Excluding the final year, the proportion of KEs ranged
from a high rate of 57% of total to a low rate of 41% of total homicides. Where both
figures align is at the point of the marked increase of both measures in the final year
(see Massey 2018: Fig. 12 and appendix 3). As a raw total, there were 100 knife-
enabled homicides in 2017/2018, almost a 100% increase over all but one of the
previous 10 years.
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Not Mostly a Gang Problem
The data contradict a widespread view that knife-enabled homicides are primarily
gang-related. Over the 10-year period, only 21% of knife-enabled homicides were
flagged by investigators as gang-related. In the final year, of the 100 knife-enabled
homicides, 29 were gang-related, showing a clear increase, but with gang connections
still a minority of all KE homicides. Conversely, however, when we reverse the analysis
to determine what percentage of these gang-related homicides are knife-enabled, we see
that a majority of gang homicides (59%) are knife-enabled (Massey 2018: Figure 13).
Fig. 1 Annual homicide totals in London, 2008–2018
Fig. 2 Homicide trends by category, 2008–2018
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Minimal Concentration
In the short run, the concentration of KE homicides in space appears to be relatively
minimal, compared to robberies (Sherman et al. 1989) or to crime in general (Weinborn
et al. 2017). Over 10 years, the 590 knife-enabled homicides were spread across in 523
LSOAs, which suggests a very low rate of any repetition of KE homicides (but not
necessarily of KE woundings; see Table 1). Highlighting the LSOAs where over
10 years, two or more (knife-enabled) homicides occurred, shows the highest 57
LSOAs accounting for only 119 knife-enabled homicides. These findings suggest that
KE homicide locations are dynamic rather than stable—and more likely to be predicted
by other, more frequent types of crimes besides prior KE homicides, such as nonfatal
knife assaults.
The top-ranked 151 LSOAs for nonfatal assaults show far more repetition in 1 year
(2016/2017) thanKEhomicides show in 10 years. These top 151 accounted for 781 nonfatal
knife assaults, a mean of over five knife injuries in 12months. This nonfatal pattern creates a
clear power few of 3% of LSOAs with 22% of all nonfatal knife assaults. Compared to the
more general pattern of crime concentration (Weisburd 2015), nonfatal KE injury is far more
similar to that power few pattern of concentration than is KE homicide.
Moving Targets
A geographical analysis (Massey 2018) also revealed movement of KE homicides from
the first half of the 10-year period to the second; only one of the LSOAs that
experienced a knife-enabled homicide in the first half also experienced a homicide in
the second. This is suggestive of a moving power few LSOAs for knife homicides,
which might well be anticipated by a moving pattern of nonfatal KE injuries. The
pattern of movement is reinforced by the fact that boroughs experiencing the highest
number of homicides changed substantially between in the first and second 5-year
Fig. 3 Knife-enabled homicides as a proportion of the yearly total
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periods analyzed. From three adjoining south-central London boroughs in the first half
of a decade, the highest incidence of homicide has moved to the far north, east, and
west of the capital within the period (see Massey 2018: Figs. 15–18).
Short-Term Correlation
Despite the dynamic nature of KE injury and homicide locations, over the 2-year period
of our analysis, the injury locations appear to match the homicide locations. This
correlation may be visualized by comparing the mapped distribution of year 1
(2016/2017) KE injuries by Ward in Fig. 4 to the LSOA prevalence of KE Homicides
in year 2 (2017/2018) in Fig. 5. This fact sets the stage for answering the four key
research questions.
Findings: Four Research Questions
1. Does the prevalence of KE homicide across LSOAs in 1 year (year 2) predictably
increase from lower to higher frequencies of KE assaults in an LSOA in the prior
year (year 1)?
Yes, the evidence shows a strong predictive relationship between the number of KE
injury assaults in LSOAs in year 1 and the N of KE homicides in year 2. Table 1
displays the full range of categories of year 1 KE injury frequencies in relation to the
prevalence of KE homicides in year 2. Figure 6 shows the percentage of LSOAs with
year 2 KE homicides across a combined set of just seven of the year 1 assault frequency
categories displayed in Table 1.
Table 1 Prevalence of LSOAs with KE homicide in year 2 by frequency of KE injury assaults in year 1
Number of nonfatal
knife-enabled assaults








in this group with
1 or more knife-enabled
homicides in year 2
(2017/2018)
Percent of LSOAs
with a year 2 homicide
within each year 1
injury category of
LSOAs
0 2781 30 1.1
1 1258 28 2.2
2 454 20 4.4
3 186 7 3.8
4 74 3 4.1
5 35 3 9
6 14 1 7
7 10 2 20
8 8 2 25
9 4 0 0
10 3 1 33
12 1 0 0
14 1 0 0
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Fig. 4 Knife-enabled injury frequency by Ward across London, 2016/2017
Fig. 5 Knife-enabled homicide prevalence by LSOA, 2017/2018
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Figure 6 shows that the more near-miss KE injuries occur in an LSOA, the greater
the risk of KE homicides. The difference in risk levels does not appear as a fluke in an
otherwise random pattern. In a progression of increases in KE homicide risk from 1 to
15%, the broad pattern is clear: the more prior nonfatal KE injuries over the previous
12-month period, the higher the risk of KE homicides in the next year. (No test of
statistical significance is required since the data comprise a universe, not a sample).
This pattern is made all the stronger for what it does not contain: it is not a rolling 12-
month period between nonfatal assaults and a rollingmonitoring period for KE homicides. It
would be better to conduct the analysis that way if the digital resources become available. As
presented, Table 1 lacks data on how much time elapsed between the end of the year 1
baseline measure of nonfatal KE injuries and the date of the KE homicide. That fact is
unavoidable in the present analysis, for which nonfatal events were identified by humans
reading thousands of crime reports. Were those data to be converted to digital coding at the
point of crime reports entered into the CRIS system, there could be a more precise analysis
linking a defined (but rolling) 365-day period for counting nonfatal KE injuries into a 365-
day follow-up period formonitoring KE homicide. Such a digital system could also stabilize
the estimateswith larger datasets, especially at the highest risk levels in the top 41 LSOAs, in
which theN of KE homicides in the numerator drops to only 6 (see Table 1). Nonetheless, at
the highest levels of non-fatal knife crime, the predicted risk of homicide in the next year
rose to 33% (Table 1). With a rolling digital 365-day forecast, it is possible that risk levels
that high could be reliably identified.
2. How much higher is the highest risk level for KE homicide compared to the lowest
risk level, in terms of the likelihood that any KE homicide occurs in year 2?
Fig. 6 Percent of LSOAs with year 2 knife-enabled homicide by frequency of year 1 knife-enabled criminal injury
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As Fig. 6 shows, there is a large difference in the 2017/2018 risk of KE homicides between
the 41 LSOAs that had six or more KE injuries the year before and the 2871 LSOAs that had
no KE injuries the year before. While the risk of KE homicides is not zero anywhere in
London, in most places (especially where no previous knife assault injuries have recently
occurred), the homicide risk is only a tiny fraction of the risk at the highest levels of prior-year
injuries. The highest risk level, based on nonfatal assaults, is 15 times higher than the lowest.
While the difference from the lowest (1% KE homicide risk) to the highest (15% KE
homicide risk) may appear to be small in absolute terms, it is a very large increase in
relative terms. It not only means that there is a 15% chance of a KE murder in areas that
may normally receive no more patrol than adjoining areas of 1% risk. It also means that
relative to other areas that police could target for homicide prevention, these areas are
over 1400% more likely to have a murder than most LSOAs in London. The events
remain rare for individuals. But for police, a target with a clearly identified 15% risk of
any homicide is also a rare event, usually prompting substantial investments in
protection. This clarity, of course, could be strengthened by replications of the analysis
within London for other time periods, as well as in other UK cities.
3. What is the level of “sensitivity” or true positive homicide prediction rate from a decision
to target LSOAs with extra policing resources at different levels of KE assaults?
4. What is the level of “specificity” or true negative rate from a decision to target
LSOAs with extra policing resources at different levels of KE assaults?
Table 2 presents the data that answers these questions. In sum, there is not much
difference in specificity, or false positive rates, between targeting only the highest risk
LSOAs, on the one hand, and targeting all LSOAs that had any prior nonfatal KE
injuries in year 1, on the other (Table 2, column D); both are in the high 90% false
positive range. Nor is there much difference in true negative rates between not targeting
the 4794 areas that had five or fewer KE injuries and not targeting 2787 that had zero
KE injuries in year 1 (Table 2, column C). High rates of false positives and true
negatives are the result no matter which level of risk targeting is examined.
To make this analysis transparent, we describe the formula for calculating the
percent of true negatives: subtract the N of homicides likely completed (column G in
Table 2) from the N of LSOAs not targeted (column C in Table 2) and divide the




























15% 41 4794 85 98 6/97 = 6% 94 (93)
12% 76 4759 91 98 9/97 = 9% 91 (88)
5% 790 4045 96 99 39/97 = 40% 60 (58)
3% 2048 2787 98 99 67/97 = 69% 31 (30)
1% 4835 0 99 – 97/97 = 100% (0)
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difference by the N of LSOAs not targeted (also column C of Table 2). The formula for
false positives is similar: subtract the N of maximum homicides prevented (Table 2,
column F) from the N of LSOAs targeted (column B) and divide the difference by the N
of LSOAs targeted (Table 2, column B).
What matters most for policing, however, is some measure of available resources.
That is certainly a matter for testing. But, it is also a matter that is informed by the
results in Table 2. What matters most in police decisions is not the rates of false
negatives, but the absolute number—especially for homicides. Hence, the discussion of
Table 2 in policing terms would likely place special emphasis on columns F and G.
These columns present commanders with five scenarios. The first is presented in the
bottom row of the table: to assign equal levels of KE homicide prevention across
London. That would guarantee that something has been done to stop every potential
KE homicide. It could also guarantee that very little can be done anywhere, including
the highest risk areas, because London is so large.
The next targeting scenario (see Fig. 7) is presented in the second row up from the
bottom: invest heavily in all LSOAs with any KE injuries in the preceding 12 months.
That choice would, perhaps block by block, direct officers to focus on less than half of
the LSOAs in London (2048 out of 4835 = 42%). By minimally investing in the 58% of
LSOAs with the lowest risk, police resources could have targeted 69% of all KE
Fig. 7 Percent of homicides potentially prevented by targeting all 2048 areas with prior stabbing
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homicides in 2017/2018, or 67 out of 97. Yet, that leaves 30 KE homicides that are not
addressed in the same way. And while the rate of false negatives is very low across
those thosuands of LSOAs not receiving extra resources (only 1%), the absolute
number of 30 murders is very high in a London context.
Figure 8 displays the targeting scenario in which police concentrate most heavily on
the LSOAs that have the highest level of risk of knife homicide (15%). This is by far
the most efficient use of police resources. It is also the least effective, if it attracts 100%
of available resource. Even if that prevented 100% of the murders in those areas, that
would prevent only 6% of all KE homicides. Thus, merely targeting the very highest
risk levels does not seem to be a viable strategy.
Much would depend, of course, on resource availability, and perhaps even the
competing priorities within each of the 12 basic command units. Yet, the highest risk
areas would be given priority at a cost of an even higher absolute count of false
negatives. If a commander wished to give very high levels of investment to the 41
highest LSOAs, where the risk of KE homicide is 15%, that strategy would only
prevent a maximum of six homicides. That is why these data are best used to inform a
targeting strategy. They certainly cannot speak for themselves.
Conclusions
What many police commanders might do with these findings is to make a graduated
allocation of resources. With three or four different levels of investment guided by the
risk forecasts, commanders could guarantee that every LSOAwould get some level of
Fig. 8 Maximum percent of homicides prevented by targeting all 41 highest-risk areas
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preventive policing against knife crime. Yet, they could also guarantee that the greatest
investment in prevention could be targeted on the LSOAs with the greatest risk, where
the chances of prevention are greatest and target areas are smallest in number.
To the extent that this study becomes a first step towards an automated digital
policing system, there is a potential for treating preventive policing much like reactive
response policing. If nonfatal stabbing occurs in an LSOA—and perhaps the third
stabbing in 3 months (or what would more predicably happen with 3 stabbings in 3
days or even three hours)—a high-risk level for that LSOA could be declared. Intensive
policing, at least for a short period of time, could lead to greater risk of concealed
weapons being detected. Arrests could increase for absconded persons in the LSOA.
Focused deterrence on knife carrying could become highly visible. If a digital analysis
shows that after several months, or even weeks or days, that the risk of KE homicide
has declined, the resources invested in preventing KE homicide in that area could be re-
allocated to other areas that have recently received a high-risk-of-homicide forecast—
perhaps defined as any short-term level of over 10% chance of a homicide.
A transparently calculated level of KE homicide risk could even become the basis
for a special authorization of police powers to use stop and search within the very
confined area of an LSOA. This idea would likely require a substantial dialogue with
local communities in order to gain legitimacy. Yet, the evidence supporting such a
decision would at least be clear—unlike qualitative intelligence that can often not be
divulged as to its source nor transparently examined for its reliability.
Regardless of what commanders might do with these findings, the most important
policy implication of this analysis is that it is now operationally out of date: not the research
method, that is, but the specific lists of high-risk LSOAs. The analysis has shown that these
data and methods can forecast KE homicide risk with known rates of error, in specificity
and sensitivity. But, it is by definition a short-term analysis. The case for digital policing is
that a computer program can automatically run the same analysis every day, or even several
times a day, to present the most accurate forecasts on the most up-to-the minute datasets.
The brute fact is that such analysis is not possible under current IT systems in England.
The digital category of nonfatal knife injury by assault, to our knowledge, does not exist in
police records for England and Wales. It is only by manual labor that this analysis was
made possible.We recommend that crime recording systems be altered as soon as possible
to allow a keystroke by the reporting officer to indicate the occurrence of a KE injury in
any legal category of crime. Then and only then can the relevant data be accessed in real
time to use twenty-first-century data analysis to forecast when and where these murders
are most likely to occur—and most likely be preventable.
In broad strategic terms, a quintessentially utilitarian approach is indicated: police
leaders could deploy greater resources to the power few LSOAs to address the most
significant proportion of crime harm, achieving the greatest benefit for the largest section
of the community. LSOAs are small in size, few in number, and can be targeted by regular,
high visibility patrols. BCU-level data processing can calculate up-to-date analysis at the
LSOA level to reveal their most recent, vulnerable to KE homicide locations.
Such patrols do currently take place but are often deployed across whole boroughs
for short, isolated periods. This research has clearly demonstrated that LSOA geocodes
can be ascribed to a larger volume of knife-enabled, nonfatal assaults, providing police
leaders with more precise targeting data to assign hotspot patrols. This permanent,
concentrated, LSOA-level analytic focus would yield its own invaluable local
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intelligence, help identify emerging mobility patterns, and fuel the evidence-led ap-
proach. Nor is it likely that targeting police actions so tightly would merely displace the
offenses elsewhere (Mazeika 2014; Weisburd et al 2006).
In more specific terms, this geographical understanding can inform a myriad of
different preventative as well as enforcement initiatives. Isolating the most vulnerable
areas allows more selective targeting, for example, of schools, with additional resources
such as physical safeguarding measures. These might include journey-to-school chap-
erones; knife arches at school entries; closer monitoring of pupil exclusions, internal
peer-relationships, and gang affiliations; and greater local authority and police over-
sight upon specific vulnerable youths. Thus, preventative targeting of LSOAs could
lead to community partnership measures as well as extra patrol activity.
Accordingly, a multi-agency board overseeing locally accountable multi-agency
teams, dedicated to designing and implementing preventative intervention programs,
is well worth testing as evidence-based policing (Sherman 2013). By combining
expertise with specific LSOA-level knowledge, a more preventative outlook can be
attained. The achievability of such a proposal is underscored by the plethora of such
multi-agency groups that already exist for retrospective homicide assessment. By
forecasting KE homicide risk, digital policing could encourage prospective multi-
agency action in very local areas.
Provided further EBP principles of tracking and testing were employed, the success
or failure of these actions could be readily captured for ongoing data analysis. Targeting
is only the first step to better knowledge of what works to prevent murders. Testing and
tracking alternative responses to digital policing forecasts is needed for the long run. At
the same time, targeting itself can be improved by continuing to build more data into a
forecasting model. This study is a first step towards making that investment. So far, the
evidence suggests that investment could reap substantial dividends.
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